No conceivable definition of public health can fail to include defense against atomic attack. The very word "public" implies a series of problems facing numerous individuals more or less simultaneously; "health" means the prevention of death or illness and the restoration of the afflicted. The millions in our possible target areas are the "public," and the 100,000 to 500,000 possible casualties following attack by each atomic bomb are the "health" problem. The program for the prevention of death or injury, and the prompt treatment of those afflicted have a top priority on the public health agenda in America today. The solution differs in no significant way from our attack upon familiar public health problems. It is based upon the same time-tested and proven plan, including an accurate determination of our needs, the application of what resources are available or can be made available, and the education of our citizens to understand the problem and act purposefully to meet the challenge.' Preparation for atomic disaster as a public health program The need for a program for defense against atomic attack is quite apparent, and it is not my purpose to review again the grim logistics of death and injury. Although the exact date of atomic attack upon our land remains with the enemy, if it is known at all, we do possess some knowledge of the apparent effect of this weapon upon our cities. It is as if we knew that an epidemic might strike within the next few years, with its devastation directed essentially against our major cities. Such knowledge, imperfect as it might be, would yet justify an all-out attack on the problem by forces ordinarily channeled against our usual killers, such as tuberculosis, cancer, and heart disease. This warning we have already received with respect to atomic attack. The present world unrest, the knowledge that an unfriendly nation possesses the atomic bomb, the statements of the military all justify forearming, else our good fortune in being warned will have been wasted. That is why state health departments have now accorded civil defense a top priority, and why efforts have been begun and are now rolling in high gear to provide the needed resources.
challenge of atomic attack? The atomic bomb produces no new and mysterious illness. Medical science has long been aware of the effects of total body radiation, of severe burns, of shock, of extensive wounds, and crushing injuries. Scientific advances have occurred during the past war which have resulted in the most amazing record in the history of military medicine. We are on the threshold of recommending the widespread use of certain cheap, readily stockpiled, and highly effective plasma substitutes for the treatment of shock; we will have available a simple dressing for the local treatment of burns, and new wide-spectrum antibiotics to combat infection. We have a new respect for the value of whole blood which has accompanied the increased willingness of our citizens to act as donors. We enter this emergency with ample knowledge of the required medical techniques. We find the necessary supplies and equipment already invented, and their use, on the whole, well justified by adequate scientific research.
A program for civil defense Yet, resources, while available in the absolute sense, are of little value to the attacked city which has not received its share. Medical knowledge which is isolated in ivory-towered research institutions will save few lives. In addition, much more is required in the way of influencing community attitudes toward active and adequate preparation for civil defense. Mention will be made of some of the more important attempts which are being made in New York State to meet these problems-to meet them by means of a state-wide civil defense public health program.
Organization for civil defense. Our organization for civil defense' is based upon the principle of decentralization. Standing orders will permit field services to begin operations immediately after attack as required by the local situation. Serious delay will result if central control must plot the area of destruction and then order specific field units into action to sites selected only after the receipt of reports from the front. Any interruption in the chain of communications will result in lack of service at the time when it is needed most. True, central control must be prepared to correlate the field efforts, close the gaps, relieve workers at forward posts, and secure and channel aid from beyond the attacked city. Yet, personnel arriving early on the scene, if they have been trained in their functions, can be saving lives long before an exact appraisal of the conditions in the devastated area can be made. This decentralized plan implies large numbers of highly trained medical volunteers, each capable of working together with any other individual who can round off the complement of his squad. For this reason, training, practical experience, and drill of medical volunteers are afforded a high priority in our civil defense program.
The organization for medical defense of a target area is based upon a sector pattern: The city is divided into several wedge-shaped areas radi-ating out from that point in the city where a bomb explosion might do the most damage. The sector is under the direction of a supply and assignment depot located several miles beyond the periphery of town and it is the station from which mutual aid is channeled toward the aid stations and hospitals. The actual control for first-aid activities remains with the secondary aid stations. These are scattered throughout and beyond the target area, one every two miles in each direction, and serve as the mobilization point for first-aid personnel within the general target area. After attack, teams of physicians, dentists, medical aides, nurses, and messengers will travel from this station toward the devastated area setting up first-aid stations where they are required, as many as are found needed, and with such quantities of personnel as are available. Later, additional personnel will arrive from unattacked areas. As first-hand reports are received from the aid stations, the organization can be solidified, the efforts co6rdinated, the work rendered more efficient. But during the early hours it is the secondary aid post that will be in contact with its own daughter first-aid posts, acting to relieve their pressure by receiving ambulatory casualties from them, giving litter cases the additional care required prior to hospitalization, and acting as a triage center.
Standardization of medical treatmeent. If the health officer would attempt to combat a widespread epidemic with limited forces, he would be wise to limit his armamentarium to a few cheap, effective, yet easily learned procedures. So it must be in civil defense. No matter how many persons make up our medical teams for first aid there will be many more injured during the first few hours than can receive immediate care. During the last World War, it was found that delay in providing prompt treatment for the seriously injured could result in irreversible shock. Speed is therefore essential; a physician cannot take hours to debride and apply vaseline gauze dressings to a complicated burn case or to sew up minor lacerations while dozens of seriously wounded are hour by hour approaching that period of irreversible shock. Much of the treatment must be done by nonmedical personnel, and there is a limit to the complexity of treatment procedures which they can learn and learn well. Moreover, it is beyond the capacity of our resources to provide dozens of alternate treatments, each with its particular devotees among the medical profession. For these reasons, under the guidance of the State Medical Society's Committee for Emergency Preparedness, the nine medical schools in New York State nominated their outstanding men to panels dealing with shock and fluid treatment, treatment of fractures, burns, general surgical trauma, radiation illness, and anesthesia, narcotics and related drugs. The recommendations5 of these panels were ironed out by a conference committee composed of two men from each group. The courage and grasp of the problem shown by these outstanding physicians were indeed gratifying. Orthopedic surgeons agreed that at improvised emergency hospitals fractures might be reduced without the use of x-ray facilities, that instead of stocking many varieties of special fracture equipment, they could get by with little more than Thomas splints, cotton wadding, and 5-inch plaster bandage. Burns are to be dressed with the simplest of materials such as the new Army burn dressing or even clean sheets over which turkish towels are placed for bulk. There was almost complete agreement that under emergency conditions nonmedical personnel can be trained to do numerous procedures at present exclusively within the domain of the physician.
Training of physicians and medical volunteers. Refresher courses for physicians have already been held in New York State, acquainting them with these panel recommendations. To date, over eighty such courses have been held under the auspices of county medical societies, and over six thousand of our upstate physicians have attended one or more of the sessions.
The training of physicians will not in itself be enough to insure adequate first-aid care for the expected number of the injured. Any available pair of hands fairly well trained in the simple techniques for the control of hemorrhage will save lives which would be lost if our sole resource was a skilled surgeon five miles or even five blocks away. Moreover, so great will be the pressure of first aid upon physicians that as many of the treatments as possible must be delegated to nonmedical personnel. Our plan provides for three types of submedical skill. Those who are dentists, veterinarians, or medical students can perform most of the minor surgery, intravenous work, and special procedures such as bone marrow transfusions. Nurses, too, will assist in these functions, taking over in addition the applications of dressings, splints, and the giving of parenteral medications. The last group is that of medical aides which includes stretcher bearers, ambulance drivers, first-aid workers, and nurses' aides. These will function in any capacity required by the exigencies of the situation.
Training for dentists, veterinarians, medical students, and nurses will be aimed at adapting their skills to the new techniques they will be called upon to perform. The medical aide group is being urged to take the full 22-hour first aid course offered by the American Red Cross. Much thought has been given to the best method of additional teaching of special skills and important organizational patterns. Probably the final result will be the establishment of several training centers throughout each city where all the medical volunteers can meet together periodically to learn the organization and operations, receive more intensive training in their duties, and, -by means of actual practice drills, learn the divisions of responsibility. Some of this training should be given in a hospital emergency room so that nonprofessional groups may become accustomed to the sight of injured patients and gain that reassurance which comes from knowing that one's efforts in an unfamiliar field are successful.
Training of the citizen. Because emergency medical personnel cannot promptly reach all persons injured in an atomic explosion, each citizen should know the principles of first-aid care for his injuries and for those of his neighbor. In New York State such an eight-hour program of instruction is being taught in four sessions of two hours each.3 A select corps of instructors has been trained in each of the six state regions and these, in turn, are organizing and teaching a large number of local instructors. Our goal is to give this course to all citizens of high school age or older, and particular emphasis will be placed on reaching those who reside in target areas.
As is true in all public health programs, prevention is the most effective of all control measures, and the greatest saving of life will occur if each citizen takes the proper measures after the red alert. Hence, programs in public education are deemed of the utmost importance, not only in the prevention of disability and loss of life, but also in reducing panic, improving morale, and allowing for the successful operation of plans for emergency field medical services.
Psychological preparedness. Public indifference to the possibility of disaster from the atomic bomb, or overanxiety concerning its terrors, are alike in predisposing toward panic after attack, while interfering with effective efforts to prepare for medical defense. If we can encourage exactly that amount of anxiety which will lead to purposeful activity for defense, we will also be successful in immunizing our population against widespread panic.2 Our citizens are informed about the true facts of atomic power and its destructive effect, yet they are also told how to volunteer for service, what our organizational plan will be, how they must be trained to care for themselves and others. We hope to instill a feeling of responsibility and self-reliance by making this training realistic. We expect to inculcate a feeling of identity with a state-wide civil defense organization instead of a small group which may become disorganized after attack. We plan to hold practice drills so as to make their functions after attack more routine, more an integral part of their habitual activity, and consequently less terrifying and panic provoking.
Role of nmedical specialists. With the possible exception of New York City, no target area in our state can be self-sufficient after an attack by even a single atomic bomb. In fact, we have estimated that almost one half of the physicians in upstate New York will be required to give adequate care to the injured resulting from a sneak attack upon one of our major cities.
For this reason, little or no distinction can be made between types of physicians during the first 24 to 48 hours after disaster. Each must do his part in field station, emergency, or permanent hospital as determined by the local need at each specific time. V\Te, therefore, plan no specific recruiting drives for first-aid physicians, traumatic surgeons, or orthopedists. Each physician in New York State, physically capable of service after attack, is being recruited for a single entity, medical defense. His actual role after attack will vary less with his specialty than with the specific problem. We can make no promise to him now as to the limits of his travel, professional utilization, or site of activity.
This means that during the first phase after attack most industrial physicians and surgeons will work, as will other physicians, primarily in first-aid stations. Some, it is true, may begin service in improvised or existing hospitals to be joined later by those who first performed emergency service in field posts. Since first-aid stations will be set up in structures within the disaster area near large concentrations of injured, it will be a relatively rare occurrence that an industry with its medical complement will find itself so located as to be able to utilize its facilities effectively as an aid station. Nevertheless, we are recommending that industries stock a small supply of first-aid equipment, estimated on the basis that 40 per cent of their employees may become injured. After attack, even if the industry is not so situated as to be within easy litter carry of the bulk of the casualties, its supplies can be drawn upon during the early period before the supply service can effectively tap regional depots.
In the days remaining between now and possible attack the industrial physician has several significant functions to perform. In New York State he has been urged to take the leadership in selling to industry the importance of on-the-job training in first aid for all employees. He must do his part in recruiting volunteers to serve as medical aides, nurses, and nursing aides, and accept his share of the responsibility for training them. Because of his knowledge and skill in traumatic surgery and mass medical care, his value to the program of postgraduate medical teaching of physicians should be emphasized. He should enroll in civil defense and be prepared to accept any medical task required. In short, while we can recognize no large group of physicians as exclusive from the standpoint of prior assignment for duty after attack, we must utilize vitally needed abilities possessed by industrial physicians in forwarding our programs of preparedness for atomic warfare.
Conclusion
The specter of atomic attack is a grim one; the devastation of our major cities will be great. Although no one in this country has first-hand experience with this particular menace, we believe that the tested and proved public health principles can be applied to minimize its effect. Determination of our needs has been based upon that Army data which has been interpreted and released. Our resources in men and material have been studied, standardized, and are being made available in practical fashion to our target areas. Attempts are well under way to secure acceptance of new ideas, new programs, and new activities on the part of each citizen. Some anxiety is being encouraged, but in every case an attempt is made to indicate the correct useful path toward reassurance.
Present evidence points toward our having the menace of atomic attack with us for a long time to come. The solution to the problem of preparation for medical defense against the atomic bomb must therefore remain a top priority health program. Alert to changes in its scope, ever ready to reevaluate our resources, critical of our progress, mindful of its effect upon the minds and activities of our citizens, New York State expects to meet this challenge with even greater energy and co6perative effort than has yet been applied to the solution of a major public health problem.
